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Abstract
Background: This study analyzes the impact of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank
liquidity creation to investigate the existence of moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.
Methods: It uses data from 197 listed and unlisted Chinese banks, spanning the period
2005 to 2014. Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, fixed and random
effect model, and pool data techniques have been used for analysis.
Results: Total liquidity creation by Chinese banks is declining, and NPLs ratio has started
to increase following a continuous decline between 2005 and 2012. We find that liquidity
creation by Chinese banks does not depend on NPLs ratio. We repeated the analysis for
small and large banks and the results of these subsamples reinforced our findings for the
aggregate sample.
Conclusions: We did not find the evidence of moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.
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Background
Non-performing loans (NPLs) are unwanted byproduct of performing loans and are
considered as “financial pollution” because of their adverse effect on economic growth
(Gonzales-Hermosillo 1999; Barseghyan 2010; Espinoza and Prasad 2010; Nkusu 2011;
Zeng 2012). International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) compilation guide of March 2006
defines “loans (and other assets) should be classified as the NPL when (1) payments of prin-
cipal and interest are past due by 3 months (90 days) or more, or (2) interest payments
equal to 3 months (90 days) interest or more have been capitalized (re-invested into the
principal amount, refinanced, or rolled over (i.e. payment has been delayed by arrange-
ments)” IMF (2006). Similarly, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) defines “a default is
considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when the obligor is past
due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the banking group” BIS (2006).
The recent incarnation of the idea that banks create liquidity traces back to the
studies of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). According to these
studies, banks create liquidity on-balance sheet by financing relatively illiquid as-
sets with relatively liquid liabilities. Another set of studies point to the liquidity
creation by off-balance-sheet activities of the banks. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)
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and Kashyap et al. (2002) propose that banks also create liquidity off the balance
sheet by commitments to provide liquidity to their clients, in case of need. Previ-
ous studies have also analyzed the role of banks as risk transformers. According to
Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986), banks transform risk by issuing
riskless deposits to lend risky loans. There are many similarities in the banks’ role
as liquidity creator and risk transformer.
Moral hazard occurs where one party takes higher risk because the consequences will
be borne by another. Many studies have been conducted regarding a moral hazard
problem after the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976) (Zhang et al. 2015;
Foos et al. 2010; Shrieves and Dahl 2003; Gorton and Rosen 1995). It is a phenomenon
which cannot be observed directly, but it is detected by other behaviors, and in case of
banks, it is excessive risk taking in lending. Almost all of the existing studies use loan
growth rate as a measure of bank risk taking (Zhang et al. 2015; Foos et al. 2010;
Shrieves and Dahl 2003; Berger and Udell 1994). Some other studies investigate a moral
hazard problem by a using shareholder structure, and it is believed that banks con-
trolled by shareholders take greater risk than their counterparts controlled by managers
(Saunders et al. 1990; Demsetz and Strahan 1997; Zhou 2014). However, to the best of
our knowledge, none of the studies use the concept of bank liquidity creation (risk
transformation) and NPLs to study the moral hazard problem.
There are numerous existing studies which explore macroeconomic and banking in-
dustry specific determinants of NPLs for different countries and regions, and most of
them find an inverse relationship between macroeconomic environment and NPLs
(Ghosh 2015; Zhu et al. 2014; Skarica 2014; Louzis et al. 2012; Zeng 2012; Espinoza
and Prasad 2010). Similarly, there are many studies which provided different models
and theories regarding bank liquidity creation. The number of studies which provide
empirical evidence regarding bank liquidity creation and its relationship with bank cap-
ital has surged after the important paper of Berger and Bouwman (2009a) (Hackethal et
al. 2010; Lei and Song 2013; Horvath et al. 2014; Chatterjee 2015). To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing studies investigates the a moral hazard problem by
analyzing the relationship between bank liquidity creation and NPLs.
Therefore, this study investigates the moral hazard problem in the case of Chinese
banks by using the concept of NPLs and liquidity creation. Our null hypothesis is that in-
crease in NPLs leads to higher liquidity creation, i.e., a moral hazard problem exists in
Chinese banks. Our hypothesis is based on the studies of Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976). According to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), increase in
NPLs affects bank lending. Prudential banks reduce lending when they have higher NPLs,
and the banks having a moral hazard problem tend to increase lending in the presence of
higher NPLs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there are two types of moral hazard
problems. According to managerial rent-seeking, managers lend to “pet projects” taking
care of their personal benefits. Secondly, shareholders prefer risky portfolios by ultimately
transferring risk to depositors. Therefore, we will conclude that a moral hazard problem
exists for Chinese banks if liquidity creation increases in response to higher NPLs.
To test the abovementioned hypothesis, we used the data from 197 listed and
unlisted Chinese banks spanning 2005 to 2014. First of all, we calculated the dollar
amount of liquidity created by using three step mechanism established by Berger
and Bouwman (2009a). We used “cat fat” measure to calculate the overall liquidity
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created by on-balance-sheet as well as off-balance-sheet activities and “cat nonfat”
measure to compute liquidity creation by on-balance-sheet activities only. To ad-
dress the possible issue of endogeneity, we used system GMM technique to esti-
mate the effect of NPLs on bank liquidity creation. We found that liquidity
creation by Chinese banks does not depend on level of NPLs, i.e., we did not find
the evidence of a moral hazard problem in Chinese banks. To be sure about our
findings, we repeated the analysis by using random effect, fixed effect, and pool
data techniques. The results obtained by different techniques confirmed our finding
that there is no evidence of a moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.
We extend the existing literature on the moral hazard problem, bank liquidity
creation, and non-performing loans in a new direction. To the best of our know-
ledge, this study is the first one to use the concept of liquidity creation and NPLs
to study moral hazard problem. We believe that liquidity creation is a better meas-
ure of bank risk taking compared to loan growth because it not only includes on-
balance-sheet activities but also risky off-balance-sheet activities in its formula. Li-
quidity creation is also a better measure because it provides us the absolute
amount rather than a relative figure, which is offered by loan growth. Furthermore,
loans may grow faster based on the policies adopted by government and not as a
result of excessive risk taking but increase in liquidity creation shows the true risk
taken by banks, regardless of the government policy. We also contribute to existing
literature by providing the evidence regarding the moral hazard problem from an
emerging market having a socialist system with Chinese characteristics.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The “Literature review” section provides a review
of relevant existing studies. The “Methods” section describes the data and regression
framework. The “Results and discussion” section presents the results obtained by ana-
lysis, and the “Conclusions” section mentions findings and implications of the study.
Literature review
This study relates three different strands of literature: the studies regarding bank liquid-
ity creation, non-performing loans, and moral hazard problem. Some of the most rele-
vant studies have been discussed below.
Studies regarding bank liquidity creation
There has been a surge in the studies concerning bank liquidity creation after the im-
portant paper of Berger and Bouwman (2009a). Most of these studies provide the em-
pirical evidence regarding the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation.
The studies prior to the abovementioned study just established hypotheses regarding
bank liquidity creation, without providing the empirical evidence, except that of Deep
and Schaefer (2004). Former studies establishing the theories regarding the relationship
between bank liquidity creation or risk transformation and capital have been mentioned
in the “Background” section. Some of the most relevant empirical studies regarding li-
quidity creation have been discussed below.
Deep and Schaefer (2004) created a relative measure of liquidity creation, known
as liquidity transformation gap (LT gap). It is calculated as the difference of liquid
liabilities and liquid assets divided by total assets ((liquid liabilities − liquid assets)/
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total assets). They applied this measure on the data of 200 largest US banks ran-
ging from 1997 to 2001 and found that LT gap is about 20 % of the total assets
on average. They argue that US banks do not create much liquidity.
Although the measure of liquidity creation established by Deep and Schaefer
(2004) was not comprehensive, it was a step forward. Following their work, Berger and
Bouwman (2009a) established four much better measures of liquidity creation. The mea-
sures created by them are known as “cat nonfat,” “cat fat,” “mat nonfat,” and “mat fat”. All
the measures are similar in a way that they classify activities other than loans by using in-
formation regarding product category or maturity. They differ from each other on the
basis of loan classification and on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet activities. “Cat”
measures classify loans on the basis of category, and “mat” measures classify them on the
basis of maturity. “Nonfat” measures exclude off-balance-sheet activities, but “fat” mea-
sures include them to calculate liquidity creation. Berger and Bouwman (2009a) prefer cat
fat measure over other measures. According to all the “BB” (Berger & Bouwman) mea-
sures, a bank create $1 of liquidity when it converts $1 illiquid assets into $ 1 liquid liabil-
ities. Similarly, a bank destroys $1 of liquidity by transforming $1 of liquid assets into $1
illiquid liabilities. A bank does not create or destroy liquidity when it converts $1 of liquid
assets into $1 of liquid liabilities or $1 of illiquid assets into $1 of illiquid liabilities or
equity.
Hackethal et al. (2010) used the measures of liquidity creation proposed by Deep
and Schaefer (2004) and Berger and Bouwman (2009a) to compute the liquidity
creation and explore its determinants for German saving banks using data ranging
from 1997 to 2006. They found that liquidity creation by German saving banks in-
creased by 51 % over the period. They used multivariate dynamic panel regression
framework and found that macroeconomic variables particularly the monetary pol-
icy indicators had a strong negative effect on liquidity creation, and bank specific
variables like bank financial performance and size did not affect liquidity creation.
Distinguin et al. (2013) investigated the relationship between bank regulatory capital
and liquidity measured from on-balance-sheet activities. They used the data of US and
European publically traded commercial banks spanning 2000 to 2006. The study found
that banks decrease their regulatory capital when they face higher illiquidity or create
more liquidity. They also observed that small US banks increased their capital when
exposed to higher illiquidity. Lei and Song (2013) also used BB measures to explore the
relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation by using the data of Chinese
banks, ranging from 1998 to 2009. They found an inverse relationship between bank
capital and liquidity creation and concluded that “financial fragility–crowding out” hy-
pothesis holds for Chinese banks. They also discovered that “risk absorption” hypothesis
holds for foreign banks working in China.
All the previous studies were focused on measuring the liquidity creation and the
effect of changes in capital on liquidity creation. Horvath et al. (2014) extended
the literature to a new direction. They show that the relationship between capital
and liquidity creation is not unidirectional. They proposed that bank liquidity
creation also affects the amount of the capital. They embedded Granger causality
test in a dynamic GMM panel model and used the data of Czech banks spanning
2000 to 2010. Their study found that bank capital negatively Granger-causes liquid-
ity creation and liquidity creation negatively affects the capital as well. They show
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that bank management and authorities have to trade off between the stability in-
duced by higher capital and benefits of liquidity creation.
Studies regarding non-performing loans
There are many studies which investigate NPLs of banks from different perspectives
but most of them focus on exploring the determinants of NPLs. Studies related to the
determinants of NPLs can be divided into three categories: the studies which investi-
gate macroeconomic determinants (Nkusu 2011; Skarica 2014; Beck et al. 2015) only,
the studies which explore bank-specific determinants only (Berger and DeYoung 1997;
Boudriga et al. 2010; Dhar and Bakshi 2015), and the studies which analyze bank as
well as macroeconomic determinants of NPLs (Espinoza and Prasad 2010; Louzis et al.
2012; Klein 2013; Tanaskovic and Jandric 2015; Ghosh 2015). The studies related to the
determinants of NPLs trace back to the “financial accelerator theory” of Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and the “life cycle consumption model” of
Lawrence (1995). Some of the studies which analyze NPLs of Chinese banks from dif-
ferent perspectives are given below.
Lu et al. (2007) explored the relationship between Chinese banks’ lending behavior
and level of NPLs. They used the data from a set of publically listed companies and
concluded that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) got more loans compared with other
firms. The most surprising finding of their study is that the SOEs which had high prob-
ability of default were able to get more loans compared with their less risky counter-
parts. They suggested that authorities should put hard budget constraints on SOBs and
SOEs to control vicious cycle of NPLs’ accumulation.
Suzuki et al. (2008) studied the role of economic rents in the compilation of NPLs in
a Chinese banking system. They used financial constraints model as an analytical
framework and concluded that the main reason for dismal performance of banks was
failure to create sufficient economic rents. Their study pointed to the importance of an
informal financial system by stating that they are critical for the economic growth of
China because they lent to private firms, which are generally neglected by a formal
banking system. They warned that if the authorities will not tackle the issue of NPLs in
the formal banking system, it will lead to economic slowdown.
Zeng (2012) analyzed NPLs in a Chinese banking system by using utility function
based on optimal control theory and concluded that the phenomenon of NPLs was
mainly significant in state-owned banks. The study revealed that equilibrium of NPLs
in China was dependent on microeconomic factors but was influenced by macroeco-
nomic factors. The study suggested that internal management efforts must be en-
hanced, along with reforms in property rights, media policies, and hidden guarantees
provided to SOEs by the government to bring the level of NPLs down.
Zhu et al. (2014) analyzed the relationship between productivity, efficiency, and non-
performing loans in a Chinese banking system. They used directional distance function
and Metafrontier-Luenberger productivity indicator to investigate the abovementioned
relations by using data from 25 commercial banks, ranging from 2004 to 2010 period.
Their study concluded that pure technical efficiency of state-owned commercial banks
was better than joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. They also
found that non-interest income was the main source of inefficiency for SOCBs.
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Studies regarding moral hazard problem
Many studies regarding a moral hazard problem have been conducted after the seminal
paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Some of the most relevant studies have been dis-
cussed below. Keeley (1990) found that a fixed rate deposit insurance system incites
banks for excessive risk, i.e., promote a moral hazard problem. Keeley argue that a de-
posit insurance system worked well for over half a century but the problem started to
pop up in the early 1980s when increase in the competition caused decline of bank
charter values, which ultimately resulted in increased default risk via increase in assets
risk and reduction in capital.
Hellmann et al. (2000) studied whether capital requirements are effective enough to
combat a moral hazard problem or not. They found that the minimum capital require-
ments are inefficient in combating a moral hazard problem. They discovered that de-
posit insurance and freely determined deposit rates weaken prudent bank behavior and
put forward that franchise value at risk provokes banks to prudent investment. They
concluded that both deposit rate controls and capital requirements can collectively pro-
duce better results compared to capital requirements only.
Extending literature on bank capital and franchise value, Repullo (2004) presented a
dynamic model of imperfect market competition in banking industry and show that re-
duction in intermediation margins results in lower franchise value, and in the absence
of regulations, exists a gambling equilibrium. In this situation, flat rate equilibrium re-
quirements or binding deposit rate ceiling can ensure the existence of prudent equilib-
rium. The study concluded that risk-based capital requirements are always effective for
preventing banks from excessive risk taking.
By using the data of 729 banks ranging from 1993 to 2000, Nier and Bouwmann
(2006) found that government safety nets result in lower capital buffer and stronger
market discipline results in higher capital buffers, ceteris paribus. They also found the
effect of uninsured funding and disclosure in the presence of higher government sup-
port. They concluded that higher risk taking as a result of increased competition could
be curtailed by imposing intensive market discipline on banks in markets where the
competition among banks is high.
Barseghyan (2010) studied the role of delayed bailout of banks by Japanese govern-
ment on economic slowdown in the last decade of the twentieth century and first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century. They found that existence of NPLs along with delayed
bailout led to consistent decline in economic activity via decline in investment, labor,
and total factor productivity. Bruche and Llobet (2011) argue that banks have incentives
to roll over bad loans to hide losses because of their limited liability. They suggested a
voluntary scheme for banks to disclose bad loans, which can be foreclosed. They argue
that this scheme will stop creating windfall gains for shareholders. They also suggested
to pass on some losses to the depositors.
Koudstaal and Wijnbergen (2012) used the data of US banks spanning 1993 to 2010
and found that banks with troubled loan portfolios take more risk, and for the banks
whose share price decreases sharply, try to resurrect it by increasing risk of their port-
folios. However, they did not find any evidence that deposit insurance encourages risk-
taking behavior. Luo and Ying (2014) studied whether political connections of listed
companies help them to obtain bank lines of credit or not. They used the data of listed
Chinese companies ranging from 2004 to 2009 and found that political connections
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help firms to obtain bank lines of credit, particularly from state-owned banks. They also
discovered that political connections have a stronger effect on obtaining lines of credit
for companies which have financial constraints, not owned by government, or located
in regions of intense government involvement.
Zhang et al. (2015) points to the existence of a moral hazard problem in lending by
Chinese banks. In other words, they studied the impact of NPLs on Chinese banks’ be-
havior. They used threshold panel regression and used data from 60 city commercial
banks, 16 state-owned banks, and 11 rural commercial banks spanning 2006 to 2012.
The findings of study supported moral hazard hypothesis which means that increase in
NPLs ratio increases riskier lending, which may cause further deterioration in loan
quality and stability of the financial system.
Methods
The sample of this study includes the data of 197 publically listed and unlisted Chinese
banks ranging from 2005 to 2014. According to Bankscope database, there are 245 fi-
nancial intermediaries currently operating in China but we eliminated all those firms
for which we did not have the observations for total customer deposits. So, our sample
includes only banks which are actively involved in the business of taking deposits and
extending loans. Financial statements were extracted from Bankscope database of Bureau
van Dijk. Data regarding macroeconomic variables was obtained from the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU).
Regression framework
To test the null hypothesis of a moral hazard problem, we have used dynamic GMM esti-
mation, panel data techniques of fixed effect and random effect, and pool data framework,
following many existing studies (Espinoza and Prasad 2010; Louzis et al. 2012; Horvath et
al. 2014; Imbierowicz and Rauch 2014; Ghosh 2015). First of all, we used system GMM
estimation technique developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). We performed the same analysis by using fixed effect, random effect, and pool
data techniques as robustness test. To control for the suspected issue of endogeneity and
to know the effect of lagged value of NPLs on liquidity creation, we also performed the
analysis by replacing all the independent variables with their first lags (Lei and Song












 þ εit ð1Þ
LCit ¼ α0 þ αjit Xjit
 
þ αkit Xkit
 þ μi þ λt þ εit ð2Þ
The first equation represents the dynamic regression model, and the Eq. 2 portrays
the static one. LCit stands for cat fat and cat nonfat measure of liquidity creation. α and
a0 are the intercept of the models, i.e., constant for dynamic and static framework, re-
spectively. Xjit represents the vector of bank-specific variables including NPLs ratio,
and Xkit denotes the vector of macroeconomic variables. In the dynamic model, the
number of lags of the NPLs ratio varies from zero to four but all other control variables
take their current values (Horvath et al. 2014). All the macroeconomic variables were
treated as exogenous in one-step system GMM estimation. In the static models, no lags
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have been used. εit indicates error term in both the equations. In the second equation,
μi refer to bank fixed effect, and λt portrays time fixed effect. Detailed discussion of all
the variables used in the analysis is given in the “Variables” section below.
Variables
The variables which have been used for the analysis include the following: bank liquidity
creation cat fat measure standardized by total assets (LC_CF), cat nonfat measure standard-
ized by total assets (LC_CNF), non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPL_TL), natural
log of total assets (LN_TA), average loans standardized by total assets (AVG_LNS), market
share (MK_SHR), a measure of bank riskiness Z score (Z_SCR), return on average equity
(ROAE), earning volatility (EAR_VOL), bank leverage (TE_TA), interbank offered rate
(IBR), natural log of population (LN_POP), and percentage change in real gross domestic
product (GDP). All these variables have been discussed below in detail.
Liquidity creation
We used the three-step approach adopted by Berger and Bouwman (2009a) and Lei and
Song (2013) to estimate the absolute amount of liquidity created by Chinese banks. In the
first step, we divided all the assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance-sheet activities in li-
quid, semiliquid, and illiquid categories. This division was done on the basis of ease, cost,
and time for customers to get funds from banks and for banks to dispose of their obliga-
tions. In the second step, we assigned weights of ½ to illiquid assets, liquid liabilities, and
illiquid off-balance-sheet activities. Contrarily, liquid assets, illiquid liabilities, and liquid
off-balance-sheet activities were given a weight of −½. Semiliquid assets, liabilities, and
off-balance-sheet activities were allocated weight of zero. In step 3, we calculated the cat
fat and the cat nonfat measures of liquidity creation by combining activities performed in
step 1 and 2. The formulas to calculate cat fat and cat nonfat measures of liquidity cre-
ation are mentioned in Table 1, adopted from Lei and Song (2013).
By using the data of 197 banks, we estimated that in 2005, Chinese banks created li-
quidity of 16.20 billion USD. 6.92 billion dollars were created by on-balance-sheet ac-
tivities, and 9.24 billion dollars were generated by off-balance-sheet activities. The
overall liquidity creation decreased to 9.90 billion USD in 2007 before increasing to
12.20 billion USD in 2009. This increase in liquidity was the result of money injected
to the banking system to stabilize it after the eruption of financial crisis in the USA in
2007. In 2009, on-balance-sheet liquidity creation stood at 6.01 billion USD, and off-
balance-sheet liquidity creation amounted to 4.90 billion USD. So, the amount of li-
quidity created by on-balance-sheet activities exceeded the amount of liquidity gener-
ated by off-balance-sheet activities in 2009.
Liquidity creation by Chinese banks is on a decline since 2009. Chinese banks
destroyed the liquidity of 3.40 billion USD in 2014, for the very first time over 2005–
2014 period. The main culprit is the on-balance-sheet activities as a result of which li-
quidity of 9.62 billion USD was destroyed. Liquidity creation by off-balance-sheet activ-
ities has been quite stable after 2007. It stood at 6.30 billion USD in 2014. Liquidity
creation by Chinese banks has a declining trend over the period with no hope of in-
crease in the near future. Figure 1 shows the graph of liquidity created by Chinese
banks by on-balance-sheet activities (cat nonfat), on-balance-sheet and off-balance-
sheet activities (cat fat), and by off-balance-sheet activities only (LC_OBS).
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Table 1 Liquidity classification of bank activities and formulas to calculate liquidity creation of a
bank
Panel A: liquidity classification of bank activities
Illiquid assets (weight = 1/2) Semiliquid assets (weight = 0) Liquid assets (weight = −1/2)
Assets
Corporate commercial loans Residential mortgage loans Cash and due from banks
Investment in property Other mortgage loans Trading securities and at FV
through income
Foreclosed real estate Other consumer/retail loans Tradable derivatives
Fixed assets Loans and advances to banks Available for sale securities
Goodwill Reverse repos and cash collateral Held to maturity securities
Other intangibles At-equity investments in
associates
Other assets Other securities
Liabilities and equity
Liquid liabilities (weight = 1/2) Semiliquid liabilities (weight = 0) Illiquid liabilities (−1/2)
Customer deposits-current Customer deposits-term Senior debt maturing after
1 year
Customer deposits-Savings Deposits from banks Subordinated borrowings
Tradable derivatives Repos and cash collateral Other funding
Trading liabilities Other deposits and short term
borrowings
Credit impairment reserves
Reserves for pension and
others
















Panel B: “cat nonfat” and “cat fat” formulas
Cat nonfat= +1/2*illiquid assets 0*semiliquid assets −1/2*liquid assets
+1/2*liquid liabilities 0*semiliquid liabilities −1/2*illiquid liabilities
−1/2*equity
Cat fat= +1/2*illiquid activities 0*semiliquid activities −1/2*liquid activities
+1/2*illiquid assets 0*semiliquid assets −1/2*liquid assets
+1/2*liquid liabilities 0*semiliquid liabilities −1/2*illiquid liabilities
−1/2*equity
Adopted from Lei and Song (2013). Panel A shows that the bank activities are classified as illiquid, semiliquid, and liquid.
The weights used to calculate liquidity creation are given in parenthesis. Panel B represents two different formulas of
liquidity creation and * represents multiplication
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Non-performing loans
Non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPL_TL) is the variable of interest (Fig. 2),
and the rest of the independent variables are the control variables. A higher value of
the ratio means lower credit quality and vice versa. Historically, China had a very high
level of NPL ratio. NPL ratio surged from 12.81 % in 2002 to 34.18 % in 2003 from
where it plunged to 15.10 % in the very next year when 45 billion dollars were injected
to the Bank of China and China Construction Bank by Central Huijin Investment
(Mclever 2005). The same company injected 15 billion dollars to the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China in 2005 as a result of which NPL ratio declined further to
7.48 %. It continued to decline until 2012, reaching a level of 0.95 %, the lowest to date.
It increased to 1.01 % in 2013 then to 1.28 % in 2014. NPL ratio is expected to grow at
a faster rate because of economic slowdown.
Control variables
Many studies regarding bank liquidity conclude that banks of different sizes behave dif-
ferently (Berger and Bouwman 2009a; Distinguin et al. 2013; Chatterjee 2015). So, we
control for the bank size in our regression by including LN_TA. The natural log of total
assets instead of total assets has been used to overcome the specification distortions be-
cause the value of the dependent variables ranges from −0.30 to 0.34. We have included
average loan size to the total asset ratio (AVG_LNS) to control for the type of the busi-
ness. A bank is considered to be predominantly involved in commercial (consumer)
lending if it has higher (lower) value for this ratio. We divided the average loan size by









2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Liquidity Creation (mln $)
LC_CF LC_CNF LC_OBS










2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Non
%
-performing Loans to Total Loans Ratio
Fig. 2 NPLs ratio of Chinese bank over 2004 to 2014
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Following Berger and Bouwman (2009a), Distinguin et al. (2013), and Horvath et al.
(2014), we have included market power (MKT_POW) as a control variable because it
can affect the availability of the funds to the banks which ultimately affect lending and
hence liquidity creation. It has been calculated as the ratio of the total deposits of the
bank to the total deposits of the whole banking system in a particular year. Following
Berger and Bouwman (2009a) and Lei and Song (2013) Z score (Z_SCR), a measure of
bank’s distance from default has also been used as a control variable. It has been calcu-
lated as the sum of return on assets and equity/total assets ratio divided by standard
deviation of return on average assets.
ROAE is the measure of return on shareholders’ funds. It is measured as the
ratio of net income to average stockholders’ equity. ROAE represents the profit-
ability of the bank. It is an important control variable because increase in profit-
ability results in higher equity which ultimately affects bank liquidity creation.
ROAE has also been used as a control variable by Hackethal et al. (2010) and
Berger et al. (2014). EAR_VOL of the bank is another measure of bank riskiness.
It has been included as the control variable following many existing studies
(Berger and Bouwman 2009a; Lei and Song 2013; Horvath et al. 2014). We
measured it as standard deviation of bank’s return on average assets over the
previous 3 years.
TE_TA or total equity to total assets ratio is one of the most important
control variables. Many of the existing studies used it as the main independent
variable to analyze the effect of capital on liquidity creation (Berger and
Bouwman 2009a; Lei and Song 2013; Horvath et al. 2014). Some of the studies
argue that the relationship between bank leverage and liquidity creation is
negative (Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001; Gorton and Winton 2000) but the
others suggest that the relationship is positive (Repullo 2004; Von Thadden
2004).
IBR is one of the factors which are considered by central banks to formulate
their monetary policy. Higher IBR indicates shortage of liquidity in interbank
market and vice versa. So, in order to control for the effect of monetary policy on
bank liquidity creation, we use a 90-day interbank market rate as a proxy for
monetary policy. Following Berger and Bouwman (2009a) and Lei and Song (2013),
we also use LN_POP as a control variable. Bank liquidity creation also depends on
economic booms and busts. Generally, the banks create more liquidity during
economic booms and reduce their lending during economic slowdown. So, follow-
ing Berger and Bouwman (2009a) and Distinguin et al. (2013), we use GDP, over
the previous year as a proxy for economic growth to control for the effect of
changes in the business cycle on liquidity creation.
Results and discussion
Summary statistics
Table 2 displays the summary statics of the sample used for the analysis. The average
amount of liquidity creation by the Chinese banks is 2.77 billion USD with a standard
deviation of 15.7 billion USD. The highest amount of liquidity created by a Chinese
bank in the given period is 75.70 billion USD, and the maximum amount of liquidity
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destroyed by a bank is 53.90 billion USD. The average amount of liquidity destroyed by
the on-balance-sheet activities of Chinese banks amounts to 2.52 billion USD with a
standard deviation of 14.00 billion USD. The average of non-performing loans to total
loans ratio is 1.79 % with a standard deviation of 3.50 %. The highest value of NPL ratio
attained by a bank is 41.3 % in a year, and the lowest value of NPLs ratio is recorded at
0.01 %.
Chinese banking system is dominated by the large banks. Five Chinese banks are part
of the Global Systematically Important Financial Institutions (GSIFI) (Moenninghoff et
al. 2015). An average amount of 112 billion USD of total assets owned by 197 banks in-
dicates this fact. The minimum amount of assets held by a bank over the period is 30
million USD, and the highest amount is 3.37 trillion USD. This huge difference in
assets owned by the banks show that our analysis is unbiased as our sample includes
very small as well as very large banks. The average loans lent by Chinese banks over
the period amount to 60.80 billion USD with a standard deviation of 182 billion USD.
The average market power over the period is 0.86 %. The largest bank had market
power of 18.62 % in a particular year.
The average value of Z score is 5.86 with a standard deviation of 6.59. The average
capital ratio of Chinese banks over the period is 9.58 %. It implies that most of the
Chinese banks fulfill the requirement of the minimum capital, required by the Basel III.
Return on average equity is much higher compared to the return on average assets.
The average value of ROAE is 14.53 %, and the mean value of ROAA is 1.02 %. The
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
CF CNF NPL_TL TA LNS MKT_POW Z_SCR
Unit Million USD Million USD % Million USD Million USD % –
Mean 2766 −2518 1.787 112,000 60,800 0.855 5.860
Median 368 −265 0.980 10,000 4786 0.069 3.809
Minimum −53,900 −84,500 0.010 30 15 0.000 −0.433
Maximum 75,700 41,600 41.300 3,370,000 1,120,000 18.618 34.917
SD 15,700 14,000 3.495 360,000 182,000 2.978 6.587
25th PCT −476 −1928 0.600 3626 1852 0.033 2.175
75th PCT 1781 556 1.750 30,800 13,900 0.186 6.798
N 644 772 845 1096 947 1107 1084
TE_TA ROAE ROAA EAR_VOL IBR POP GDP
Unit % % % % % Million USD %
Mean 9.577 14.527 1.019 24.726 3.768 1328.6 9.98
Median 7.173 15.370 1.063 16.980 3.873 1329.5 9.55
Minimum 1.641 −5.897 −0.502 0.854 1.706 1300 7.3
Maximum 94.709 41.776 4.831 336.212 5.285 1356 14.2
SD 9.494 8.668 0.569 27.866 1.196 18.238 2.143
25th PCT 5.745 8.112 0.670 8.568 2.663 1312 7.7
75th PCT 9.328 19.692 1.337 30.771 5.008 1345 11.3
N 1096 1089 1089 674 1970 1970 1970
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of “cat fat” (CF) and “cat nonfat” (CNF) measure of liquidity creation-measured in
million USD; non-performing loans to total loans ratio (NPL_TL); total assets (TA), average loans (LNS); market power
(MKT_POW); measure of bank stability risk Z score (Z_SCR); bank leverage (TE_TA); return on average equity (ROAE);
return on average assets (ROAA); earnings volatility (EAR_VOL); interbank offer rate (IBR); population (POP); and percentage
change in real gross domestic product (GDP)
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average of earning volatility is 24.73 % with a standard deviation of 27.87 %. The aver-
age value of interbank offered rate is 3.77 % with a standard deviation of 1.20 %. The
average population over the period is 1.33 billion individuals. Chinese economy grew at
a rate of 10 % on average, over the period with the highest growth rate of 14.2 %
recorded in 2007.
Table 3 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix between all the variables used
in the analysis. The correlation between NPL ratio and both measures of liquidity
creation is very low but positive. The correlation coefficient between NPL ratio
and cat fat and cat nonfat ratio is 13.4 and 15.4 %, respectively. Correlation among
other variables is given in Table 3.
Regression analysis
We performed the dynamic panel regression to find the impact of NPLs ratio on bank
liquidity creation (Table 4). We used one-step system GMM to control for the issue of
endogeneity. We separately performed the regressions for narrow and broad measure
of liquidity creation and run different models having current value of NPLs to four
lagged vales. We also controlled for the variables mentioned in the “Variables” section.
The regression approach adopted for this study is similar to Imbierowicz and Rauch
(2014) and Horvath et al. (2014).
We found that bank liquidity creation by the Chinese banks does not depend on
the level of NPLs. The relationship between the current period’s NPL ratio and
both measures of liquidity creation is negative and insignificant at 5 % level of sig-
nificance. This negative relationship between NPLs and liquidity creation is oppos-
ite to our null hypothesis that increase in NPLs results in higher liquidity creation.
Increase in previous year’s NPLs is associated with higher liquidity creation in the
current year, but lagged value of NPLs is also not a significant determinant of li-
quidity creation. Furthermore, the 3rd and 4th lags of NPLs ratio do not explain
variation in liquidity creation. So, from the above results, we conclude that vari-
ation in NPLs ratio does not affect liquidity creation, i.e., we did not find the evi-
dence of a moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.
Our results contradict the finding of Zhang et al. (2015) that a moral hazard
problem exists in lending by Chinese banks. It may be because they used loan
growth as a measure of bank risk taking instead of liquidity creation. Loan growth
does not necessarily represent risk taking by banks, but liquidity creation does. We
believe that the loans grew at a relatively faster rate as a result of the policies
adopted by the government in response to global financial crisis, and not because
of excessive risk taking, which lead that study to conclude that a moral hazard
problem exists for Chinese banks.
Liquidity creation is a better measure of risk compared to loan growth because it in-
cludes both on-balance-sheet as well as off-balance-sheet activities in the formula, but
loan growth is based on on-balance-sheet activities only. Furthermore, bank liquidity
creation is a more objective measure of risk taking compared with credit growth be-
cause liquidity creation gives us an absolute amount of risk transformation. According
to liquidity creation, the overall risk taken by Chinese banks shows a declining trend
over the period. Moreover, our results are more reliable because we have used data of
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Table 3 Pair-wise correlation matrix




NPL_TL 0.134*** 0.154*** 1
(0.002) (0.000)
LN_TA −0.104*** −0.101*** −0.139*** 1
(0.009) (0.005) (0.000)
AVG_LNS 0.311*** 0.389*** 0.179*** 0.046 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157)
MKT_POW −0.005 0.045 0.051 0.584*** 0.067** 1
(0.895) (0.214) (0.142) (0.000) (0.041)
Z_SCR −0.041 −0.027 −0.069** 0.236*** −0.099*** 0.019 1
(0.304) (0.464) (0.047) (0.000) (0.003) (0.525)
TE_TA −0.264*** −0.259*** 0.077** −0.434*** −0.162*** −0.106*** −0.147*** 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ROAE 0.292*** 0.226*** −0.153*** 0.267*** −0.010 0.087*** 0.300*** −0.451*** 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.755) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
SD3_ROAA −0.001 −0.040 0.038 −0.427*** −0.091** −0.156*** −0.302*** 0.436*** −0.208*** 1

















Table 3 Pair-wise correlation matrix (Continued)
IBR −0.267*** −0.269*** −0.185*** 0.171*** −0.272*** −0.071** 0.217*** −0.010 0.092*** −0.175*** 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.738) (0.002) (0.000)
LN_POP −0.311*** −0.305*** −0.309*** 0.239*** −0.352*** −0.106*** 0.256*** 0.047 0.075** −0.215*** 0.668*** 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP 0.303*** 0.294*** 0.271*** −0.220*** 0.292*** 0.083*** −0.227*** −0.053* −0.048 0.166*** −0.545*** −0.829*** 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.077) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

















Table 4 The effect of NPLs on liquidity creation
Broad measure of liquidity creation Narrow measure of liquidity creation
LC_CF LC_CF LC_CF LC_CF LC__CF LC_CNF LC_CNF LC_CNF LC_CNF LC_CNF
NPL_TL −0.006 −0.017 −0.005 0.015 −0.03 −0.011* −0.014** −0.012 −0.006 −0.038*
(−0.50) (−1.17) (−0.26) (0.62) (−1.43) (−1.72) (−2.11) (−0.79) (−0.36) (−1.72)
L.NPL_TL 0.007 0.006 −0.002 0.031 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.044**
(0.44) (0.32) (−0.11) (1.53) (0.72) −0.38 (0.66) (2.14)
L2.NPL_TL −0.007 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 −0.007 −0.004
(−1.01) (−0.86) (−0.23) (−0.65) (−1.30) (−0.26)
L3.NPL_TL 0.003 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.005
(0.58) (−0.07) (−0.06) (−0.75)
L4.NPL_TL 0.003 0.001
(0.53) (0.17)
LN_TA −0.014 −0.019* −0.027*** −0.017** 0.003 −0.016* −0.023*** −0.028*** −0.020** −0.007
(−1.24) (−1.92) (−3.05) (−2.02) (0.53) (−1.85) (−2.87) (−3.32) (−2.40) (−0.70)
AVG_LNS 0.429*** 0.289*** 0.435*** 0.470*** 0.324*** 0.280*** 0.347*** 0.501*** 0.576*** 0.495***
(4.06) (2.93) (4.20) (4.50) (2.78) (3.48) (3.86) (5.00) (5.56) (4.05)
MKT_POW −0.657 −0.536 −0.357 −0.586* −0.908** 0.138 0.400 0.168 0.065 −0.462
(−1.35) (−1.31) (−0.99) (−1.66) (−2.41) (0.34) (1.03) (0.44) (0.17) (−1.08)
Z_SCR −0.001 −0.008*** −0.006** −0.007*** −0.003 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.0004 0.001
(−0.33) (−3.14) (−2.52) (−2.66) (−0.98) (0.72) (0.81) (0.12) (0.14) (0.27)
ROAE 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.002
(2.64) (4.63) (4.60) (4.48) (3.97) (2.34) (2.22) (2.97) (2.57) (0.72)
EAR_VOL 0.101 −0.078 −0.106** −0.084 −0.078 −0.004 −0.021 −0.046 −0.051 −0.011
(0.94) (−1.42) (−2.19) (−1.57) (−0.81) (−0.13) (−0.71) (−1.03) (−1.06) (−0.11)

















Table 4 The effect of NPLs on liquidity creation (Continued)
(−2.20) (−1.40) (−1.98) (−1.55) (0.71) (−3.05) (−2.68) (−2.03) (−1.75) (−1.01)
IBR −0.01* −0.008 −0.004 −0.0001 −0.001 −0.015*** −0.012*** −0.011** −0.01* −0.004
(−1.93) (−1.46) (−0.87) (−0.02) (−0.16) (−3.65) (−2.83) (−2.49) (−1.93) (−0.48)
LN_POP −1.039 −1.087 −1.797 −2.657** −3.713** −2.038** −1.608 −1.69 −1.425 −2.773
(−0.89) (−0.72) (−1.35) (−2.28) (−1.98) (−2.33) (−1.64) (−1.49) (−1.39) (−1.45)
GDP 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.003 −0.007 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.005 −0.004
(0.93) (1.39) (0.96) (0.56) (−0.90) (1.03) (0.78) (0.3) (0.78) (−0.49)
CONS. 7.545 8.05 13.251 19.225** 26.575* 14.860** 11.86* 12.462 10.346 19.915
(0.90) (0.74) (1.39) (2.29) (1.96) (2.37) (1.69) (1.53) (1.40) (1.45)
Sargan (p value) 0.710 0.760 0.990 0.002 0.451 0.282 0.358 0.05 0.241 0.762
AR (1) (p value) 0.198 0.547 0.707 0.183 0.062 0.106 0.143 0.083 0.287 0.457
AR (2) (p value) 0.819 0.843 0.974 0.972 0.585 0.613 0.798 0.649 0.839 0.952
N 420 396 367 282 216 445 418 384 291 221
Table 4 reports the results regarding the impact of non-performing loans on bank liquidity creation, obtained by one-step system GMM estimation. The dependent variables are either broad or narrow measure of


















197 banks spanning 10 years, but the abovementioned study used the data of just 87
banks covering 8 years only.
AVG_LNS and ROAE are the control variables which are significant determinants
of variation in broad as well as narrow measure of liquidity creation. The signifi-
cant relationship between AVG_LNS and liquidity creation implies that liquidity
creation depends on the type of business a bank is involved in. The positive rela-
tionship between AVG_LNS and liquidity creation means more liquidity is created
when a bank lends larger loans. This result supports the findings of Hackethal et
al. (2010). The positive relationship between bank profitability and liquidity cre-
ation suggests that banks which have high profitability create more liquidity and
vice versa. Increase in profitability result in higher amount of available funds and
hence higher amount of liquidity creation.
The variation in broad measure of liquidity creation is also explained by the riskiness
of the bank (Z_SCR) and the bank capital. The inverse relationship between Z_SCR
and cat fat measure of liquidity creation means that risky banks create more liquidity
and vice versa. Increase in risk taking results in higher liquidity creation. The negative
relationship between Z_SCR and LC_CF is according to the findings of Lei and Song
(2013). According to these findings, the banks having higher equity capital compared
with their assets create less liquidity compared to their highly leveraged counterparts.
The negative relationship between capital and broad measure of liquidity creation sug-
gest that “financial fragility–crowding out” hypothesis holds in the case of Chinese
banks. This result supports the findings of Lei and Song (2013).
The other control variables which explain variation in narrow measure of liquidity
creation include the following: bank size, capital ratio, and interbank offered rate. The
negative relationship between bank size and liquidity creation suggests that larger
banks create relatively less liquidity compared with their smaller counterparts. This
negative sign of relationship between bank size and liquidity creation support the find-
ings of Hackethal et al. (2010), Lei and Song (2013), and Horvath et al. (2014). The re-
lationship between bank capital and narrow measure of liquidity creation is also
negative, providing support to the findings of Lei and Song (2013). Unlike broad meas-
ure of liquidity creation, narrow measure depends on the availability of the funds in the
interbank market. A higher interest rate in the interbank market results in lower liquid-
ity creation by on-balance-sheet activities. It means that when the liquidity in the inter-
bank market shrinks, the banks reduce lending and vice versa. Using IBR as a proxy for
monetary policy, the results imply that tight monetary policy result in lower on-
balance-sheet liquidity creation by the Chinese banks.
In order to make it sure that liquidity creation by Chinese banks does not depend on
NPL ratio, we repeated the analysis by using fixed and random effect techniques of
panel data. Time and bank variant unobserved factors were controlled by bank and
time dummies. All the regression estimates are robust because we controlled for het-
eroskedasticity and possible correlation between observations of the same bank in a dif-
ferent year by clustering banks. We repeated the same analysis by replacing all the
independent variables with their first lags to control for the issue of endogeneity (Lei
and Song 2013). We also repeated the analysis by considering the data as pool rather
than panel. The results obtained by all these methods reinforced our initial finding that
there is no relationship between NPL and bank liquidity creation in the case of China,
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i.e., we did not find the evidence of a moral hazard problem in Chinese banks. The re-
sults are given in Table 5.
Regression analysis on the basis of bank size
The existing studies in the field of liquidity creation argue that liquidity creation by the
banks depend on their size. Berger and Bouwman (2009a) found that large US banks
created 81 % of total liquidity while medium sized banks generated 5 %, and small
banks produced 14 % of the overall liquidity. Similarly, many studies have found that
the relationship of bank liquidity creation with other variables also differ for the banks
of different sizes (Berger and Bouwman 2009a; Distinguin et al. 2013; Imbierowicz and
Rauch 2014; Chatterjee 2015). So, following the norm in the existing literature and our
findings for the overall sample, we have conducted the analysis on the basis of bank
size to determine whether there exists a relationship between NPLs and liquidity cre-
ation for small and large banks.
Different studies divide banks in different categories on the basis of different criteria.
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) divided the banks in small, medium, and large categor-
ies by dividing the total assets of the banks in three quantiles. The first, second, and
third quantiles represented small, medium, and large banks, respectively. Chatterjee
(2015) also divided the banks in three categories. A bank was considered small if the
total assets of the bank were less than $1 billion; medium, if the total assets were more
than $1 billion but less than $3 billion; and large, if the total assets were greater than
$3 billion. Distinguin et al. (2013) also divided banks in small and large categories. They
considered a bank small, if the total assets of the bank were less than $1 billion, and
large otherwise. Following the methodology adopted by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014),
we divided banks in small and large categories by dividing the total assets of the banks
in two quantiles. The first quantile represents small banks, and the second quantile
represents the large banks. The analysis which we performed for the overall sample
was repeated for sub-samples of small as well as large banks.1 We found that liquidity
creation by small or large banks also does not depend on the level of non-performing
loans, i.e., we did not find the evidence of a moral hazard problem in small as well as
large banks.
Conclusions
This study explores the impact of NPLs on bank liquidity creation to know whether a
moral hazard problem exists in Chinese banks or not. There are many studies which
analyze bank liquidity creation and NPLs from different perspectives but to the best of
our knowledge, none of the studies use these concepts to investigate a moral hazard
problem. Existing literature regarding a moral hazard problem use credit growth as a
measure of bank risk taking, which is subjective in nature. Bank liquidity creation is a
better measure of risk taking because its objective and include both on-balance-sheet
and off-balance-sheet activities. It calculates the amount of liquidity creation or risk
transformation, which gives us absolute amount of risk taken by banks. Our null hy-
pothesis is that Chinese banks create more liquidity when NPLs increase, i.e., a moral
hazard problem exists in Chinese banks.
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Table 5 The effect of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank liquidity creation
Pool data analysis Panel data analysis (static) Panel data analysis (dynamic - lagged independent variables)
Broad Narrow Broad measure Narrow measure Broad measure Narrow measure
LC_CF LC_CNF LC_CF LC_CF LC_CNF LC_CNF LC_CF LC_CF LC_CNF LC_CNF
NPL_TL −0.002 −0.002 0.0001 −0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(−1.05) (−1.59) (0.05) (−0.19) (0.13) (0.06) (0.40) (0.78) (1.28) (1.30)
LN_TA −0.017*** −0.016*** −0.020*** −0.105*** −0.019*** −0.117*** −0.021*** −0.120*** −0.024*** −0.102***
(−4.02) (−4.62) (−2.78) (−2.76) (−3.31) (−2.97) (−2.57) (−3.56) (−3.58) (−3.13)
AVG_LNS 0.249*** 0.295*** 0.271*** 0.087 0.282*** 0.063 0.243*** 0.051 0.318*** 0.143
(4.95) (6.9) (4.52) (0.80) (5.38) (0.56) (3.33) (0.35) (4.78) (1.03)
MKT_POW 0.09 0.401*** 0.244 0.824 0.549** 1.022 0.25 0.782 0.596*** 0.324
(0.66) (3.47) (0.89) (1.10) (2.42) (1.13) (0.93) (1.05) (2.66) (0.48)
Z_SCR −0.002*** −0.001** −0.001 0.015** −0.001 0.013** −0.0003 0.023** −0.0001 0.013
(−2.85) (−2.48) (−1.12) (2.14) (−0.95) (2.12) (−0.23) (2.20) (−0.06) (1.26)
ROAE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** −0.0001 0.003*** 0.0003 0.002 −0.002 0.002 −0.001
(5.21) (5.85) (3.73) (−0.06) (3.45) (−0.29) (1.57) (−0.73) (1.49) (−0.42)
EAR_VOL −0.021 −0.02 −0.009 0.003 −0.002 0.023 −0.015 0.007 −0.007 0.017
(−1.05) (−0.96) (−0.58) (0.16) (−0.09) (1.05) (−0.99) (0.39) (−0.31) (0.73)
TE_TA (0.26) 0.01 −0.597* −1.148** −0.244 −0.993** −0.465 −1.032** −0.317 −0.765
(−0.92) (0.04) (−1.95) (−2.41) (−0.96) (−2.45) (−1.55) (−2.35) (−1.16) (−1.56)
IBR −0.008 −0.013** −0.048* −0.004 0.005 −0.007 0.01 −0.003 0.004 −0.009
(−1.35) (−2.49) (−2.04) (−0.50) (0.14) (−0.81) (0.80) (−0.37) (0.27) (−1.03)
LN_POP −1.931* −1.541 0.065* −2.949 −9.233*** −6.978**
(−1.85) (−1.60) (2.53) (−1.09) (−3.32) (−2.38)
GDP 0.004 0.004 0.001 −0.005 −0.005 −0.013 −0.026*** −0.008 −0.019* −0.006

















Table 5 The effect of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank liquidity creation (Continued)
CONS. 14.075* 11.177 1.864** 21.397 2.098*** 66.944*** 2.109*** 50.630** 1.730***
(1.87) (1.61) (2.58) (1.11) (2.83) (3.34) −3.34 (2.39) (2.82)
Framework OLS OLS Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect
Bank dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.391 0.373 0.399 0.378 0.412 0.370 0.415 0.403 0.431
N 420 445 420 420 445 445 336 336 358 358
Table 5 represents the results regarding the impact of non-performing loans on bank liquidity creation, obtained by pool data analysis (left most), static (middle), and dynamic (right most) panel data analysis. The
dependent variables are either broad or narrow measure of liquidity creation standardized by total assets. All the independent variables in the dynamic panel model assume one period lagged value. Parentheses

















In order to analyze the impact of NPLs on bank liquidity creation, we measured it by using
a three-step procedure proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009a). We calculated liquidity
creation by using cat fat and cat nonfat measure of liquidity creation. Total liquidity creation
by 197 Chinese banks shows a declining trend over 2005 to 2014. To analyze the impact of
changes in NPLs on bank liquidity creation, we used one-step system GMM estimation,
fixed and random effect techniques, and pool data analysis. We found that liquidity creation
by the banks is independent of changes in NPLs, i.e., we did not find the evidence of a moral
hazard problem in Chinese banks. We repeated the analysis for small and large banks and
found that level of NPLs does not affect liquidity creation in any of these sub-samples, which
support our finding of none existence of a moral hazard problem in Chinese banks.
Our findings suggest that bank regulators should be vigilant to the increase in the NPLs
ratio which is expected to grow as a result of slow economic growth. They should also be
careful about the decline in liquidity creation because increase in NPLs and reduction in
liquidity creation may collectively suppress already slowing economic growth leading to a
downward spiral. The regulators should continue reforms in the financial sector to make
it resilient, competitive, and efficient. Regarding future research, the concepts of liquidity
creation and NPLs should be used to study the moral hazard problem in developed and
least developed countries to determine whether it exists there or not.
Endnotes
1The Results have not been presented here for brevity but can be provided on
demand.
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